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Rethinking Symbolic Racism: Evidence of
Attribution Bias
Brad T. Gomez University of South Carolina
J. Matthew Wilson Southern Methodist University
This paper demonstrates that cognitive tendencies related to political sophistication produce an attribution bias in
the widely accepted symbolic racism scale. When this bias is controlled statistically, the effect of symbolic racism on
racial policy attitudes is greatly diminished. Our theory posits that high sophisticates tend to make global/distal
attributions, allowing them to associate racial inequality with broader sociopolitical causes. Less sophisticated individuals, conversely, tend to make local/proximal attributions, thus biasing them against ascribing responsibility systemically. Consequently, less sophisticated individuals tend to be classified as intolerant by the symbolic racism scale,
even when controlling for factors such as ideology and anti-black affect.

critical component of whites’ attitudes toward
blacks is their beliefs about the causes of
poverty in the black community and social
inequality between the races more generally.1 These
attitudes contribute significantly to whites’ positions
on public policies geared to ameliorate racial
inequities, such as affirmative action (e.g., Hughes and
Tuch 2000; Sniderman et al. 1986) and welfare (Gilens
1996). For some whites, the observed disparity
between the races is a function of systemic causes,
such as unequal educational and job opportunities
or a legacy of discrimination (“structuralist attributions”; Feagin 1972). Conversely, other whites view
racial disparities as a product of traits stereotypically
associated with individual African Americans, such as
a poor work ethic or a lack of intelligence (“individualistic attributions”).
Previous research—in political science and other
disciplines—has shown that, while both structuralist
and individualistic attributions contribute to whites’
racial policy attitudes, the former, though less
common, play a more powerful role than the latter
in predicting these attitudes (e.g., Hunt 1996; Kluegel
and Smith 1986). Individuals who accept structuralist
explanations for black poverty are more supportive of
policies intended to assist blacks. Yet many questions

A

remain unanswered about how structuralist and individualistic attributions themselves are formed. Some
scholars, most notably Kluegel and Smith (1986),
provide a sociological explanation, arguing that
socioeconomic status strongly shapes individuals’
explanations for poverty. By this account, the difference in attribution patterns may merely be a function
of social class—the “haves” think the “have-nots” are
lazy, while the latter think the former benefit disproportionately from social arrangements. Perhaps the
divergence runs deeper, stemming from psychological
differences inherent in the construction of causality.
After all, interpersonal attributions are a fundamental
component of social cognition (Fiske and Taylor
1991). This raises a key question: Does an individual’s
cognitive complexity increase his or her likelihood
of making certain causal linkages, while mitigating
the perceived importance of competing explanatory
factors?
In this paper, we advance a theory of heterogeneous attribution, wherein individual differences
in cognitive sophistication within a relevant domain
condition the tendency to attribute responsibility
to proximal (individualistic) or more global
(structuralist) causes. We argue that individuals low
in political sophistication, controlling for other factors

1

Blacks comprise a disproportionate share of the poor in the United States, about 25%, and are more than twice as likely as whites to live
in poverty (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).
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such as ideology and racial animus, are unlikely
to attribute responsibility for racial inequality to
social causes. Given a more limited comprehension
of the sociopolitical world, low sophisticates have
a decreased propensity to construct broad social
explanations and, correspondingly, to devise/
acknowledge social solutions. High political sophisticates, who are more likely to understand the complexity of the sociopolitical world, do have the
cognitive capacity—a large store of integrated political referents in associative memory (e.g., McGraw and
Pinney 1990; Tetlock 1995)—to make structuralist
attributions, and are thus more likely to do so. In
short, we contend that variation in whites’ attributions
regarding the causes of black poverty and social disadvantage is a function not simply of economic selfinterest and/or racial prejudice, but also of cognitive
style.
While the cognitive foundations of attributions
for racial inequality are in themselves important, our
work also has ramifications for the widely used and
often debated concept of symbolic racism. Recent
work by Tarman and Sears (2005) demonstrates that
the factorial structure of the traditional symbolic
racism scale is best explained by the structuralist and
individualist attribution concepts. Consequently, we
reexamine symbolic racism and its effect on policy
attitudes in light of the theory of heterogeneous attribution. Simply put, we argue that individual responses
to the battery of survey items generally used to create
the symbolic racism measure may be biased by cognitive ability and shaped by factors completely independent of the underlying racial animus that the scale
seeks to capture. This attribution bias affects placement on the symbolic racism scale, since those who
respond positively to the structuralist items are considered low in symbolic racism, while individualist
respondents are scored high. If the theory of heterogeneous attribution is accurate, individuals low in
political sophistication may be biased against accepting the structuralist items and in favor of the individualist ones for reasons wholly apart from racial
hostility or ideology. Thus, low sophisticates, all things
equal, run a greater risk of being incorrectly classified
as “symbolic racists.” After demonstrating an empirical relationship between political sophistication and
symbolic racism, we reevaluate the latter concept’s
impact on racial policy attitudes. We propose that an
“errors in variables” correction be used when symbolic
racism is employed as an independent variable in
models, and show that the effect of symbolic racism
as an explanation for racial policy attitudes may be
grossly exaggerated.

 .   .  

The Attributional Foundations of
Symbolic Racism
One of the core tenets in the study of white America’s
attitudes toward race and racial policy is the concept
of “symbolic racism.” Originating with the work of
Sears and Kinder (1971), symbolic racism is meant
to describe whites’ animus toward blacks in its contemporary guise. As opposed to the overt racism of
the Jim Crow era, which Sears and Kinder argue was
repudiated and largely displaced by the end of the
1960s, symbolic racism reflects a subtler form of intolerance. The theory is built on four propositions
(Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988). First, the civil
rights movement and end to legal segregation precipitated a decline in the social acceptability of older
forms of racism. Second, this decline in overtly racist
attitudes did not represent a true proportional reduction in whites’ antipathy toward blacks. White racism
and racial stereotyping remain, but they are hidden
from public view (and, consequently, poorly measured
by survey instruments). Third, blacks are perceived by
racially intolerant whites to violate traditional American values, such as the Protestant work ethic. Finally,
racial prejudice often manifests itself as resentment;
blacks are perceived as demanding and receiving too
much from government, making it difficult for whites
to receive fair treatment.
Symbolic racism has been shown to be a powerful predictor of whites’ opposition to racial policies
and black political candidates, in some cases exerting
a larger effect than party identification, political ideology, adherence to the value of individualism, and
direct racial threat (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996;
Kinder and Sears 1981). Yet, despite these findings, the
symbolic racism concept has drawn its share of critics.
In a recent article reevaluating the conceptualization and measurement of symbolic racism, Tarman
and Sears focus on four central critiques of the construct: “symbolic racism (1) has been conceptualized
and measured inconsistently over time, (2) may not
be a single, internally consistent, and coherent belief
system, (3) may generate artifactually strong associations with racial policy preferences because of content
overlap between measures of the independent and
dependent variables, and (4) is not a distinctive belief
system in its own right, but simply reflects various
other familiar constructs” (2005, 732). The second and
fourth of these critiques are clearly related and, for our
purposes, the most compelling.
In addressing the internal coherence of symbolic
racism, Tarman and Sears examine the dimensional
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structure of survey items frequently used to measure
it. What the authors find is that—at least on point
two—their critics are correct: “the pure one-factor
model [of symbolic racism] is of borderline acceptability” (2005, 741). The authors demonstrate that
a two-factor model best represents the underlying
dimensional structure of symbolic racism. Importantly, they assert that these latent dimensions reflect
individualistic attributions and structuralist attributions for black inequality (2005, 742–48).2
Affirmation of symbolic racism’s attribution
underpinnings and empirical validation of its individualist and structuralist dimensions may not seem
especially problematic for the concept. Indeed,
Tarman and Sears contend that “the difference
between these two factors is so slight that they seem
best interpreted as two quite similar variants of the
same underlying psychological construct” (2005, 747).
We believe, however, that this contention minimizes
the potential behavioral consequences of symbolic
racism’s attributional structure. Social psychologists
have long argued that, for various reasons, different
people have different propensities for making individualistic and structuralist attributions. Moreover,
research has shown that structuralist attributions are
more closely associated with support for race-based
public policies than are individualistic ones (Kluegel
and Smith 1986). If the evidence regarding structuralist attributions and racial policy attitudes is accurate, then the link between symbolic racism and racial
policy may be more a function of general cognitive
tendencies than of racial animus. If symbolic racism
is most accurately perceived as an attribution construct (as Tarman and Sears concede), then we must
consider the possibility that variation in the scale can
be explained, at least in part, by individual differences
in attribution psychology.

Causal Attributions and Racial
Inequality
According to Feagin (1972), individuals attribute
three main causes for poverty: deficiencies of poor
people (individualistic attributions), societal barriers
(structuralist attributions), and bad luck (fatalistic
2

Our own factor analysis produces results consistent with Tarman
and Sears’ findings. Additionally, we go a step further. Using a multisample confirmatory factor analysis, we demonstrate that the
two-factor structure exists for both high and low sophisticates and
that the factor correlations between individualistic and structuralist attributions are not significantly different between the two
groups. Results are available from the authors or via the JOP web
site (http://journalofpolitics.org/articles.html).



attributions).3 Among these, the most commonly
cited explanation is the individualistic one. People are
most likely to blame economic inequality on the real
or imagined characteristics of the poor themselves,
like lack of work ethic or ability. Further research
shows that individualistic explanations of social
inequality are not simply a by-product of racial differences or racial animus. Hughes and Tuch (2000)
provide evidence that whites, blacks, Asian-Americans, and Latinos all tend toward individualistic attributions, whether one is discussing black poverty or
the misfortunes of any other group.
It has been hypothesized that the tendency to
choose individualistic over structuralist attributions is
rooted in economic self-interest. Kluegel and Smith
(1986) identify a propensity among people of higher
socioeconomic status to focus primarily on individualistic attributions. Perhaps this results from selfreflection; high SES individuals might assume that
their impoverished fellow citizens lack important
qualities that they see in themselves. Whatever the
reason, this SES effect, like the general predisposition
toward individualistic attributions, does not appear to
be restricted to whites. Hunt (1996) provides evidence
that African Americans and Latinos are actually more
apt to provide individualistic attributions than are
whites. Moreover, within these groups, Hunt reports
that systematic differences related to SES also exist,
providing further evidence in support of the selfinterest hypothesis.4
An additional distinction between individualistic
and structuralist attributions remains, one relating
not to the causes of these ascriptions but to their relationship to policy attitudes. Hughes and Tuch (2000),
among others, show that structuralist attributions are
significant predictors of support for race-based public
policies, such as affirmative action and welfare. Those
who see society and government as the source of black
social disadvantage are more inclined to favor social
and governmental solutions. Indeed, these authors
3
Fatalistic explanations are rarely invoked and thus will not be
considered in this paper.
4

One should not assume that the individualistic and structuralist
explanations are necessarily orthogonal. Kluegel (1990) notes that
individuals frequently create explanations for economic inequality from both individualistic and structuralist attributions. Interestingly, this “dual consciousness” exists even among the poor
(Kluegel and Smith 1986) and may be more likely among minority groups. Hughes and Tuch, for instance, argue that “members
of minority groups are more likely than whites to experience a
‘dual consciousness,’ simultaneously subscribing to both structuralist beliefs (by virtue of group identification) and individualistic beliefs (as a result of acculturation to dominant American
values that are relatively stable)” (2000, 167).
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demonstrate the power of system blame, indicating
that “structural attributions increase support for racetargeted policies across ethnic groups [whites, blacks,
Asian-Americans, and Latinos] regardless of which
group is the focus of attributions” (2000, 188). Thus,
it is important to note, the relationship between structuralist attributions and support for policies targeting
racial disparities (or, conversely, the relationship
between individualistic attributions and opposition to
these policies) does not necessarily stem from differing levels of racial tolerance. In theory, a linkage
between the attribution and policy may simply reflect
a necessary condition for support: to see government
as an appropriate remedy, one must first view society
as a cause of the problem.5

The Theory of Heterogeneous
Attribution
That some individuals make individualistic attributions, while others offer structuralist attributions, and
still others attribute responsibility to both, shows the
need for further theorizing on this important public
opinion puzzle, especially given the role of attribution
in predicting policy attitudes. Class and ethnicity
provide two plausible bases for these alternative
understandings of racial inequality. However, the possibility that individuals might differ systematically in
their attribution patterns due to cognitive differences
has not been examined. We believe that this consideration may provide significant insights into the
construction of social stratification beliefs generally
and into the meaning of the symbolic racism scale
specifically.
In recent work centering on ascriptions of causality (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006b), we articulate a “theory of heterogeneous attribution” as an
explanation for how citizens at various levels of
cognitive complexity assign responsibility for sociopolitical phenomena. Following Sniderman (1993),
among others, we assume that people should not be
treated as monolithic; that is, individuals should not
be thought to respond uniformly to cognitive stimuli.
Rather, we propose that systematic variation in indi5

This argument is somewhat consistent with “political models” of
racial policy attitudes put forth by Sniderman and colleagues (e.g.,
Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
However, while the political model might view structuralist attributions as necessary conditions for support for government
policy, they clearly are not sufficient. The political model asserts
that support for racial policies is also a product of ideology and
the policy alternatives on the agenda.

viduals’ ability to make causal associations is conditioned by their levels of cognitive sophistication in the
domain of politics (i.e., political sophistication). We
argue that the breadth and depth of an individual’s
political knowledge largely determines his ability
to make “local” or “global” attributions for sociopolitical phenomena. Thus, a person’s ability to
ascribe credit or blame to individual versus systemic
factors is a function of his capacity to make associative linkages between political information in different spheres.6
Attribution psychology suggests that causal attribution is affected both by the characteristics of the
problem confronting the individual and by the characteristics of the person trying to work through it. As
Hilton and Slugoski (1986) put it, the attribution
process is sensitive to the individual’s base level of
information/knowledge and motivation toward the task.
In other words, to identify a causal relationship, the
individual must have knowledge of possible causes
and be motivated to puzzle through the causal linkage.
As such, a sophisticated understanding of the subject
(domain) at hand would seem to condition the individual’s capacity to make attributions. Given that
“modern racism” is so intrinsically tied to politics, we
believe that individuals at varying levels of political
sophistication will differ in the way they make attributions regarding race in modern America.7
Following Luskin (1987), Sniderman (1993), and
our own previous work (Gomez and Wilson 2001,
2003, 2006b), we argue that individuals with differing
levels of political sophistication vary in their ability to
make associative linkages between problems and their
sources. Political sophistication is a two-fold concept
incorporating the individual’s levels of political awareness and cognitive integration (Luskin 1987).8 It
6
As Iyengar asserts, “attributions of responsibility are critical
ingredients of social knowledge” (1989, 879). As a means of inference, attributions have been shown to have powerful effects on an
individual’s attitude toward the self, emotional arousal, and interpersonal evaluations (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1991; Petty and
Cacioppo 1996). Indeed, the capacity of causal attributions to
frame interpersonal evaluations is fundamental to political opinionation, particularly assessments of political leaders (Iyengar
1989) and vote choice (e.g., Lau and Sears 1981).
7
Race in America has always been a salient sociopolitical issue,
from arguments in the early republic about slavery and representation, through debates over segregation and anti-miscegenation
laws, up to the present day. Almost all of the symbolic ways in
which modern racism is said to manifest itself reside in the political domain: affirmative action, welfare, busing, etc. Thus, we feel
comfortable in saying that racial attributions are conditioned by
political sophistication.
8

As Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock argue: “[P]olitical sophistication is a ‘bundle’ concept. It packs together related, if distinguish-
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should not be viewed simply as a summary scale of
political interest. Rather, individuals at various levels
of political sophistication cognitively engage the political world in different ways, using heterogeneous decision rules in processing political information and
making political choices. Far from maximizing the
consistency of belief system elements across the board,
individuals with differing levels of political sophistication seek congruence selectively (Sniderman, Brody,
and Tetlock 1991). In contrast to Converse’s (1964)
model of the political belief system, the sophistication
model suggests that it is the least sophisticated individuals, not the most, who attempt to maximize proximal consistency among belief elements, bringing
closely related political information into congruence.
Alternatively, highly sophisticated individuals seek
distal consistency in their political belief systems. These
political sophisticates recognize and evaluate the more
abstract elements of the political world and seek congruence between newly obtained information and
more distant components of their belief systems, such
as their ideologies.
With regard to beliefs about the causes of poverty
and social inequality more generally, the theory of heterogeneous attribution suggests several hypotheses. As
our previous work (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003,
2006b) demonstrates in the nonracial domain of economic voting, less politically sophisticated individuals
tend to focus causal attributions on the most obvious,
proximal actors (which in the case of racial disparities
would be African Americans themselves) or events.9
Thus, the theory asserts that individuals at low levels
of sophistication will find it cognitively difficult to
able, properties including a tendency to pay close attention to politics, to have ready at hand banks of information about it, to
understand multiple arguments for and against particular issue
positions, and to recognize interrelationships among those arguments” (1991, 21).
9

Readers familiar with the broader attribution literature (e.g.,
Heider 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967) might recognize
that under certain conditions the theory of heterogeneous attribution mimics the “fundamental attribution error”—“the tendency to attribute behavior exclusively to the actor’s dispositions
and to ignore powerful situational determinants of the behavior”
(Nesbitt and Ross 1980, 31). This mimicry occurs when low
sophisticates attribute responsibility to an individual (or class of
individuals) instead of systemic factors. Our present case of racial
attributions is an example of the two theories overlapping.
However, the theory of heterogeneous attribution does not restrict
itself to individual versus systemic cases. The “obvious,” proximal
attribution in some cases might be to a major event or even to a
highly salient systemic cause. For example, low sophisticates might
blame the economic recession of 2001–2002 exclusively on the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Clearly, this is not an individual attribution, so this case would not correspond with the
fundamental attribution error.



associate the condition of individuals in poverty with
broad societal forces. To do so, one must at some level
recognize the capacity of social, political, and economic factors to be systematically biased against a
segment of the population. We believe that for many
individuals at lower levels of political sophistication
this is a difficult cognitive task. Consequently, low
sophisticates will be more likely to rely on less distal
attributions and associate the causes of poverty and
social inequality with proximal characteristics of a disadvantaged group. Conversely, we believe that high
sophisticates should be more likely to possess the level
of cognitive integration required to understand the
interrelationship of more global social phenomena
(Tetlock 1995). Thus, two primary attribution
hypotheses follow:
1) Individuals at low levels of political sophistication
are more likely to make individualistic attributions
and should be systematically biased against making
structuralist attributions.
2) Individuals high in political sophistication are more
likely to make structuralist attributions, though they
may also make individualistic ones.
As a result of these hypotheses and Tarman and
Sears’ determination that symbolic racism is composed primarily of individualistic and structuralist
attribution dimensions, a corollary to Hypothesis Two
can be asserted:
Corollary: Individuals at high levels of political sophistication, ceteris paribus, are more likely to score low
on the symbolic racism scale.10
Finally, we also believe that the extent to which the
relationship between symbolic racism and racial
policy attitudes reflects racial animus may be exaggerated. We expect the relationship between the two variables to be a function of an attributional style that
varies in accordance with the theory of heterogeneous
attribution. Consequently, we propose a third and
final hypothesis:
3) Accounting for political sophistication will significantly attenuate the link between symbolic racism
and racial policy attitudes.
Importantly, we should stress that these hypotheses are
rooted in cognitive differences, not value orientations.
Thus, they should survive controls for any differences
in ideology, individualism, egalitarianism, and

10

This corollary hypothesis assumes that symbolic racism is coded
in its traditional manner.
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anti-black affect that may exist between high and low
sophisticates.

Data and Method
Our examination of political sophistication and
American racial attitudes draws on data from the 1986
and 2000 American National Election Studies.11 These
studies contain items that allow us to measure several
key concepts: individual political sophistication, symbolic racism, and racialized policy attitudes. The nowstandard symbolic racism questions were introduced
in the NES in the early 1980s, and the NES political
knowledge battery dates from several years later. The
1986 study is the first one in which both are present.
Both sets of items have been repeated (with some variation) in most of the subsequent studies. This allows
us to conduct parallel analyses in both 1986 and 2000,
the earliest and most recent years for which the necessary data are available. Results consistent across both
of these periods may reasonably be viewed as generalizable, not an artifact of ephemeral circumstances in
any one electoral cycle.
Operationally, we encounter several important
choices regarding how best to measure both racial attitudes and political sophistication. Though originally
constructed from an extensive battery of questions,
the symbolic racism scale is now typically built from
four items (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Respondents
are presented statements and asked whether they agree
strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree,
disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. We have
taken these responses and recoded them to run from
least to most “racist.” They are added and rescaled to
range from 0 (least symbolic racism) to 1 (most symbolic racism).
The individual items of the symbolic racism scale
differ in ways that allow for interesting tests of our
hypotheses regarding political sophistication and
causal attribution. Two of the items clearly tap
individualistic attributions for racial disparities in
American society, blaming African Americans’ failure
to strive for advancement and to work hard enough.
They are as follows:
1). “Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities
overcame prejudice and worked their way up.
11
These analyses are based on data compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no
responsibility for uses of this collection or for inferences based
upon such uses.

Blacks should do the same without any special
favors.”12
2). “It’s really a matter of some people not trying
hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they
could be just as well off as whites.”
The other two items, conversely, capture structuralist
attributions for black social disadvantage, placing
the locus of causality outside the individuals directly
involved. These statements cast individual African
Americans as victims of forces beyond their control.13
They are as follows:
1). “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less
than they deserve.”
2). “Generations of slavery and discrimination have
created conditions that make it difficult for blacks
to work their way out of the lower class.”
The differences between these questions allow us to
test our hypothesis that less sophisticated individuals
score higher on symbolic racism because of their
greater tendency to make localized, individual-level
attributions and their tendency to avoid global or
distal ascriptions of causality.
The operationalization of political sophistication
has long been an issue of concern (e.g., Luskin 1987).
Conceptually, we wish to capture some mix of knowledge and awareness in the domain of politics and to
assess the level of cognitive complexity with which an
individual engages social and political phenomena.14
To that end, we construct an additive index based on
eight factual queries in the NES (rescaled to range
from 0 to 1). For 1986, these include the offices held
by Vice President George Bush, House Speaker Tip
O’Neill, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

12
This symbolic racism item is also found in The Washington Post,
the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard (1995) study of racial
attitudes called the “Four Americas Survey.” In a supplemental
analysis (available from the authors or via the JOP web site), we
use these data to further validate our claims. While this study does
not include general political information items, it does measure
factual knowledge specific to the domain of race. As a result, we
are able, at least in part, to examine the robustness of our theoretical approach using two substantially different measurements
of political sophistication.
13

Tarman and Sears’ (2005) factor analysis and LISREL model
confirm that the symbolic racism items do in fact break down
along individualist and structuralist dimensions, just as we
contend here.
14
This conception of sophistication is in keeping with Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock’s (1991) “bundle concept,” combining elements
of knowledge, awareness, and complexity of thought.
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In addition, respondents are queried about the majority parties in the House and Senate.15 In 2000, the
questions are similar. Respondents are asked to identify the offices held by Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott, Attorney General Janet Reno, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
as well as the home states of presidential candidates
George Bush and Al Gore. Finally, the questions about
party control of House and Senate are repeated.16 Delli
Carpini and Keeter (1993, 1996) provide support for
this measurement approach, showing that these NES
items create a valid and reliable measure of political
sophistication (or political knowledge—they use the
terms almost interchangeably).17 Moreover, they parallel very closely the political sophistication measures
employed in our previous work (Gomez and Wilson
2001, 2003). Perhaps most importantly, in related
work, we demonstrate that our measure is indeed a
function of political interest and cognitive complexity—assessed using the Cacioppo et al. (1996) “need
for cognition” scale (Gomez and Wilson 2006a).

Models and Results
Our analysis begins by examining the premise underlying all of our more specific claims: that political
sophistication significantly decreases individuals’
scores on the symbolic racism scale, even controlling
for all of the standard predictors. For both 1986 and
2000, we construct OLS models of symbolic racism
among whites. The dependent variable is an additive
scale of responses to the four items discussed above.
Strong agreement with the structuralist attributions is
coded 0 and strong disagreement 4, while the individualistic attributions are coded oppositely. In total, this

15
The mean respondent score on the 1986 knowledge scale is .36.
The easiest item is the Bush identification (78% correct), while the
most difficult item is the Dole identification (12% correct). Principal components factor analysis reveals one common factor for
the eight items (eigenvalue = 2.46), and all variables load on the
factor to a significant degree (at least .48).
16

The mean respondent score on the 2000 knowledge scale is .46.
The easiest item is the question about Bush’s home state (90%
correct), while the most difficult item is the Lott identification (9%
correct). Principal components factor analysis reveals one
common factor for the eight items (eigenvalue = 2.45), and all
variables load on the factor to a significant degree (at least .40).
17
To capture greater variability in our sophistication measure, we
rely upon an eight-item battery of knowledge questions. In their
work, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) assert that five- and even
three-item scales work equally well in measuring differences in
political sophistication.



produces a 17-point range, rescaled to run from 0 to
1 (least to most “racist”).
We employ a variety of independent variables that
might plausibly shape individuals’ explanations of
African American social disadvantage. To begin, we
include a race-of-interviewer term, assuming that
whites might give more racially tolerant responses to
black interviewers.18 We include a battery of demographic items, including gender, age, region (South),
income, church attendance, and education. Of these,
we have particularly strong expectations for region
and education. Given the South’s difficult racial
history, we expect whites from that region to have
somewhat less favorable attitudes toward African
Americans, ceteris paribus, than whites in other parts
of the country. More importantly, education should
exert a powerful influence here, as scholars have consistently found that more educated people express
more tolerant attitudes (e.g., McCloskey 1964;
Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sniderman, Brody, and
Tetlock 1991). In the domain of race, this could be for
one or both of two reasons. First, education may
expose individuals to more diverse people and perspectives, thus enhancing tolerance and acceptance of
difference. More cynically, one might expect that education teaches people the “right” answers to questions
about race, schooling them in political correctness
rather than fostering sincere racial understanding. In
either case, we expect a strong negative correlation
between education and symbolic racism, but for
socialization, not cognitive, reasons. It is thus essential
to include both education and sophistication separately in the models.19
Beyond demographic measures, we incorporate a
set of attitudinal items that have long been thought to
do most of the “heavy lifting” in explaining individuals’ symbolic racism scores (Kinder and Sanders 1996;
Sears 1988). To begin, we include measures of partisanship and ideology, on the assumption that structuralist as opposed to individual explanations for
social disadvantage are a hallmark of liberal Democ18

In 1986, unfortunately, we are only able to identify “nonwhite”
interviewers, as blacks, Asians, Latinos, and other minorities are
all lumped together into this category. Thus, the “black interviewer” term should be viewed with some caution in analyses for
that year.
19

While education and political sophistication are clearly related,
they are empirically much more distinct than one might believe.
In the 1986 and 2000 NES, the two are correlated at about .4, not
trivial, but not overwhelming either. For our cognitive hypotheses
about attribution patterns, it is critical to demonstrate that political sophistication plays a strong role in reducing symbolic racism
scores even after controlling for the powerful socializing effects of
education.
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OLS Models of Symbolic Racism Among Whites, ANES 1986 and 2000
1986

Independent Variables
Constant
Black Interviewer
Female
Age
South
Income
Church Attendance
Education
Party Identification (Dem)
Ideology (Liberal)
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Anti-Black Affect
Political Sophistication
Adj. R2 =
N=

2000

Estimate

S.E.

Estimate

S.E.

.726
.033
−.016
−.001
.061
−.002
−.007
−.028
.002
−.021
.295
−.244
.002
−.164

.054**
.040
.016
.001
.017**
.001
.005
.006**
.003
.007**
.047**
.042**
.000**
.035**

.983
−.006
−.018
.001
.030
.002
−.003
−.026
−.002
−.020
.070
−.427
.002
−.123

.046**
.033
.015
.001
.015*
.002
.005
.005**
.004
.005**
.023**
.039**
.000**
.032**

.356**
649

.366**
775

Source: American National Election Studies, 1986 and 2000.
**p < .01, one-tailed test.
*p < .05, one-tailed test.

ratic thinking. More importantly, following key theorists in the symbolic racism debate (Sears, Henry, and
Kosterman 2000; Sniderman and Hagen 1985), as well
as the seminal work by Feldman (1988; see also
Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), we include measures
of individualist and egalitarian value orientations,
measured outside the domain of race. In the 1986
NES, we replicate the individualism and egalitarianism scales constructed by Sears, Henry, and Kosterman (2000, 117). In 2000, while the six egalitarianism
items remain the same, the items available to measure
individualism are reduced to two, and our scale is
adjusted accordingly.20 In both models, we include the
crucial variable of anti-black affect (measured with an
inverse of the feeling thermometer for blacks), assuming that old-fashioned, straightforward racial antipathy will powerfully shape responses to the symbolic
racism items. Finally, and most importantly for our
purposes, we include our political sophistication scale
to test the cognitive hypotheses that we articulate
above.
Table 1 reports the results of our overall symbolic
racism models in 1986 and 2000. The results confirm
20
These two items in the 2000 NES are Variables 000620 and
001423, asking respondents whether they believe government
should guarantee everyone a good standard of living or let people
get ahead on their own, and whether it is more important to be
cooperative or self-reliant.

both much of the conventional wisdom on symbolic
racism and our new hypotheses on political sophistication. In both years, liberals, the better educated, and
those living outside the South score lower than do
others. In addition, individualism, egalitarianism, and
anti-black affect are consistently powerful and work as
expected. Clearly, scores on the symbolic racism index
are strongly shaped by both racial hostility and general
value orientations.
Most importantly for our purposes, low political
sophistication emerges as a major predictor of symbolic racism in both years, even after controlling for
ideology, individualism, egalitarianism, education,
and anti-black affect. It is important to emphasize
these controls because the result itself may not be surprising. It is often posited that the politically sophisticated are more liberal (ideology), more schooled in
the “proper” responses and exposed to diverse perspectives (education), and/or less likely to be oldfashioned racists (anti-black affect). Any or all of these
claims may be true, yet the powerful effect of sophistication we demonstrate here persists even after
accounting for these possibilities. Thus we must look
deeper for the source of sophistication’s effect on
symbolic racism, an effect that we argue is rooted in
heterogeneous attribution.
If the effect of political sophistication on symbolic
racism results from differential causal attributions
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Ordered Probit Models of Symbolic Racism Scale Components: Individual Attributions, ANES
1986 and 2000 (Whites Only)
1986

Independent
Variables

Question 1
b (S.E.)

2000
Question 2
b (S.E.)

Question 1
b (S.E.)

Question 2
b (S.E.)

Black Interviewer
Female
Age
South
Income
Church Attendance
Education
Party ID (Dem)
Ideology (Liberal)
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Anti-Black Affect
Political Sophist.

.541 (.243)*
−.059 (.093)
.006 (.003)*
.374 (.103)**
−.016 (.008)*
−.019 (.030)
−.159 (.034)**
.012 (.023)
−.085 (.041)*
1.363 (.285)**
−1.162 (.255)**
.010 (.002)**
−.448 (.203)*

.346 (.235)
−.226 (.092)**
−.004 (.003)
.243 (.099)**
−.026 (.008)**
.015 (.029)
−.098 (.033)**
.024 (.022)
−.093 (.041)*
1.884 (.281)**
−1.058 (.250)**
.008 (.002)**
−1.060 (.202)**

−.187 (.189)
−.110 (.085)
.004 (.003)
.002 (.089)
.009 (.011)
.014 (.027)
−.142 (.032)**
−.025 (.024)
−.072 (.030)**
.370 (.135)**
−1.622 (.240)**
.006 (.002)**
−.344 (.186)*

.052 (.187)
−.137 (.083)*
.005 (.003)*
.157 (.086)*
.011 (.011)
−.029 (.026)
−.147 (.031)**
.040 (.023)*
−.116 (.030)**
.340 (.131)**
−1.698 (.231)**
.006 (.002)**
−.835 (.183)**

m1 =
m2 =
m3 =
m4 =

−2.367 (.338)**
−1.184 (.323)**
−.746 (.321)*
.333 (.321)

−2.331 (.328)**
−1.324 (.320)**
−.896 (.317)**
.309 (.317)

−3.403 (.297)**
−2.380 (.280)**
−1.925 (.277)**
−.920 (.273)**

−3.075 (.280)**
−2.048 (.269)**
−1.540 (.267)**
−.600 (.265)*

−968.440
207.57 (13)**
785

−1,078.663
253.28 (13)**
780

Log Likelihood =
LR c2(d.f.) =
N=

−827.475
213.77 (13)**
656

−872.647
220.51 (13)**
659

Question 1: “Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same
without any special favors.”
Question 2: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as
whites.”
Source: American National Elections Studies, 1986 and 2000.
**p < .01, one-tailed test.
*p < .05, one-tailed test.

rooted in general cognitive tendencies, this pattern
should manifest itself in an analysis of the individual
components of the symbolic racism scale. Specifically,
sophistication should dramatically decrease the likelihood that individuals will attribute racial disparities
to character failings or lack of hard work, while
sharply increasing the tendency to ascribe causality to
broad social factors.21 The models reported in Table 2
explore the first part of this proposition, examining
21
While the analyses might seem a bit redundant, the separate
models are necessary to demonstrate that the effect of sophistication on symbolic racism is actually symmetric, as our theory
argues. It would, of course, be possible to see the sophistication
effect demonstrated in Table 1 if the underlying mechanism
strictly worked asymmetrically. That is, if political sophistication
were found to be a significant, negative predictor of the individualist scale components, but was unrelated to the structuralist scale
components, it is possible (likely) that we would still see a significant, negative effect on the overall scale. This asymmetric effect
is not predicted by our theory. Thus, the analyses of scale components are important tests of the underlying theory.

the two individual attribution items from the symbolic racism scale in both 1986 and 2000. These
models use the same set of independent variables
employed for our analysis of the entire scale and
described above. Since responses to each individual
item range only from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4
(strongly agree), we employ an ordered probit
estimation.
The demographic items in these models are
mostly a mixed bag, with only southern residence and
(especially) education exerting a consistent influence
across years and items. Otherwise, as one might
expect, the attitudinal variables appear to drive
responses. Consistent with the findings of Sniderman
and his various colleagues, ideology has a consistent
effect, with self-identified liberals tending to shun
individualistic attributions. Likewise, orientations
toward individualist and egalitarian values have very
strong effects in the directions one would expect. Antiblack affect, unsurprisingly, also strongly motivates
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Ordered Probit Models of Symbolic Racism Scale Components: Structural Attributions, ANES
1986 and 2000 (Whites Only)
1986

2000

Independent
Variables

Question 1
Estimate (S.E.)

Question 2
Estimate (S.E.)

Question 1
Estimate (S.E.)

Question 2
Estimate (S.E.)

Black Interviewer
Female
Age
South
Income
Church Attendance
Education
Party ID (Dem)
Ideology (Liberal)
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Anti-Black Affect
Political Sophist.

−.409 (.236)*
−.056 (.091)
−.002 (.003)
−.202 (.099)*
−.004 (.008)
.057 (.029)*
.078 (.033)**
.004 (.022)
.100 (.040)**
−1.097 (.274)**
.977 (.249)**
−.011 (.002)**
.462 (.199)**

.560 (.236)**
.037 (.091)
.005 (.003)*
−.265 (.098)**
.002 (.008)
.038 (.029)
.103 (.033)**
−.003 (.022)
.068 (.040)*
−.722 (.274)**
.594 (.247)**
−.011 (.002)**
.657 (.201)**

−.100 (.190)
.134 (.083)
.003 (.003)
−.263 (.087)**
−.012 (.011)
.006 (.026)
.032 (.031)
.027 (.023)
.059 (.030)*
−.277 (.132)*
1.406 (.231)**
−.008 (.002)**
.447 (.182)**

.108 (.186)
−.009 (.083)
.005 (.003)*
−.086 (.086)
−.010 (.011)
.018 (.026)
.091 (.030)**
.006 (.023)
.068 (.030)*
−.204 (.132)
2.012 (.235)**
−.008 (.002)**
.326 (.183)*

m1 =
m2 =
m3 =
m4 =

−.804 (.316)**
.418 (.315)
1.129 (.317)**
2.229 (.331)**

−.655 (.317)*
.066 (.315)
.323 (.316)
1.655 (.321)**

.306 (.264)
1.275 (.266)**
1.790 (.269)**
3.051 (.285)**

.871 (.267)**
1.674 (.270)**
1.946 (.271)**
3.209 (.284)**

Log Likelihood =
LR c2(d.f.) =
N=

−856.537
142.58 (13)**
655

−899.050
134.06 (13)**
660

−1,050.927
160.07 (13)**
778

−1,068.509
206.71 (13)**
783

Question 1: “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”
Question 2: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of
the lower class.”
Source: American National Elections Studies, 1986 and 2000.
**p < .01, one-tailed test.
*p < .05, one-tailed test.

individualistic explanations for black social disadvantage. Most importantly, though, even after controlling
for these attitudinal orientations, political sophistication remains a consistent and powerful influence in all
four models. This result clearly lends credence to our
theory of heterogeneous attribution, suggesting a link
between low sophistication and localized, individualistic attributions that goes beyond education, ideology, values, or racial animus.
So far, we have examined individual attributions
for black social disadvantage and found strong effects
of political sophistication. There is, however, another
side of the coin: structuralist attributions. Our theory
predicts that political sophistication should exert a
strong, though opposite, influence on these items,
making individuals more likely to ascribe black misfortune to societal causes. To explore this, we model
responses to the two structuralist symbolic racism
scale components in both 1986 and 2000. These

models are directly comparable to those in Table 2;
the independent variables are identical, and again the
models are estimated as ordered probits. Here, the
dependent variables represent responses to the ideas
that blacks have “gotten less than they deserve” and
that generations of slavery and racism are to blame for
blacks’ negative social circumstances. The results are
reported in Table 3.
As one would expect, southern residence and
education continue to play a strong role in shaping
racial attributions. Other demographic items have
negligible and/or inconsistent effects. As is the case
with individualistic attributions, ideology, individualism, egalitarianism, and anti-black affect all play
strong and consistent roles. Once again, however,
political sophistication remains a significant predictor
of attributions (this time in a positive direction) even
after controlling for these other factors. More sophisticated respondents, ceteris paribus, are substantially

  :    
more likely to agree that blacks have been victimized
by societal and historical factors beyond their control,
a result consistent with the theory of heterogeneous
attribution. As the theory predicts, unsophisticated
respondents are both more likely to focus on individual loci of causality and less likely to identify social
ones.

Individualism Redux?
A comment about the proper interpretation of individualistic attributions in these findings seems necessary. A critic of our results might argue that
“individualism” has always been part of symbolic
racism. Indeed, since originally proposed by Sears and
Kinder (1971), symbolic racism has been conceived as
a blend of anti-black affect and Americans’ orientation toward economic individualism. The critic might
thus contend that our results for the less sophisticated
simply restate the denial of discrimination through
individualistic thinking on race issues.
Our response to such a concern is simple. Properly conceived, the “individualism” inherent in the
symbolic racism concept is a value orientation—more
precisely the value of “economic individualism.” The
theory underlying symbolic racism states that racist
whites view blacks as violating the norm of economic
individualism, which, based on the Protestant work
ethic, is one of the most enduring values in the American ethos (McCloskey and Zaller 1984). The individualistic attribution bias caused by differences in
sophistication, described herein, is not a product of
value orientation. Rather, the bias is a cognitive one—
individuals low in sophistication tend only to link
proximally located nodes within an associative
network, whereas high sophisticates are much more
likely to make distal connections as well. Thus, the
individualism value orientation and individualist
attribution bias are distinct, both theoretically and
conceptually.
Moreover, to the greatest extent possible, we have
attempted to distinguish these concepts and their
effects empirically. The individualism value orientation is measured in traditional fashion, and, notably,
it works as others have theorized. The attribution bias
caused by political sophistication is also significant
here, demonstrating an effect that is conceptually distinct and statistically independent from values. In sum,
we strongly believe that the effect of sophistication on
explanations for racial inequality and on symbolic
racism works precisely as the theory of heterogeneous
attribution hypothesizes.



Accounting for Systematic Measurement
Error in Symbolic Racism
It would thus appear, as we have argued, that scores
on the symbolic racism index are rooted substantially
(though clearly not entirely) in cognitive differences
between high and low political sophisticates that
shape attributional tendencies for reasons unrelated to
racial animus, education, and value orientation. If this
is true, any model incorporating symbolic racism as
an independent variable will suffer from a classic
errors-in-variables problem. To take one specific
example, claims about symbolic racism’s role in
shaping racially relevant policy attitudes may be significantly exaggerated. Rather than providing inferential evidence of a relationship between “covert racism”
and policy attitudes, the statistical relationship might
be, at least partially, spurious—a product of attributional bias. Our final analysis is devoted to an examination of this proposition. Drawing on items in the
1986 NES, we assess the real influence of symbolic
racism on individuals’ attitudes toward racially
charged policy questions, including preferences in
hiring, quotas in education, spending on food stamps,
and federal aid to blacks.22
Since we have shown that symbolic racism scores
are explained partly by differences in political sophistication as well as racial hostility, we employ and recommend Hausman’s (1978) simple test for the
presence of systematic measurement error when
symbolic racism is included as an explanatory variable
in regression models. The result is a straightforward
errors-in-variables regression model, constructed in
the following manner: Let
Y * = a + bX * + e *
i

i

i

where, Y*i represents the measured values of Yi, X*i represents the measured values of Xi, and e*i = ei − bxi, so
that e is the standard regression disturbance and xi
represents the errors in measuring Xi.23 To evaluate the
22
These are Variables 860476, 860478, 860330, and 860334,
respectively.
23

The placement of the measurement error associated with the
independent variable(s), xi, in the error term e*i = ei − b*xi results
from algebraic manipulation. Rewrite the errors-in-variables
regression so that Y *i = Yi + ui and X*i = Xi + xi, allowing ui and xi
to represent the measurement errors associated with the dependent and independent variables respectively:

(Y * − u ) = a + b ( X * − x ) + e .
i

i

i

i

i

Rearranging the error components together, we obtain
Yi* = a + bX i* + (e i + u i − xi )
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extent of measurement bias included in X*i, regress
X*i on an instrumental variable Zi deemed to be related
to the theoretical cause of the bias:
X * = g + dZ + w
i

i

i

In our case, the instrumental variable is extracted
from our 1986 model of symbolic racism estimated in
Table 1, which controls for the source of the attribution bias by including political sophistication. Incorporating the least squares residuals ŵ i from the model
above into the model of Y*i, produces
Y * = a + bXˆ * + qwˆ + e *
i

i

i

i

If the resulting estimate, q, is statistically significant,
we can reject the null hypothesis that no systematic
measurement error exists; the magnitude of q indicates the direction and extent of the measurement
bias. Perhaps more importantly, the resulting b reflects
the true estimate associated with X, which in this case
is symbolic racism.
Results of these errors-in-variables regressions are
presented in Table 4. Here, support for each of the
racially relevant policies is modeled as function of
interviewer race, the standard demographic items,
party identification and ideology, individualism, egalitarianism, anti-black affect, and symbolic racism. To
these, we add in the second column ŵ , the residuals
derived from estimating symbolic racism as a product
of political sophistication. A comparison of the coefficients for symbolic racism in these two models
should show the effects of systematic measurement
error stemming from political sophistication.
The results of this examination are dramatic.
Looking at the predictors of racial policy attitudes, we
find strong effects for political ideology, egalitarianism, Southern residence, and anti-black affect, none of
which is particularly surprising.24 Our primary interest here, though, is not really in modeling policy attitudes per se, but in assessing the modeling error that
stems from the relationship between symbolic racism
scores and political sophistication. Here, the results

The equation in the text results from considering (ei + ui) as a
single “generalized” disturbance, since measurement error in the
dependent variable, if normally distributed, will only contribute
to the overall error variance of the model. Of course, if ui is not
normally distributed or if the i units are correlated, heteroskedasticity will result. See Kmenta (1997, 346–66) for further explication. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, 197–98) also present clearly
the errors-in-variables correction.
24

The one exception to many of these general patterns is attitudes
toward food stamp spending. It would appear to be a less racially
driven issue than any of the others, not surprising since it is the
only one that does not specifically reference race.

are unmistakable. Without the measurement correction, symbolic racism shows a strong negative association with individuals’ willingness to support all of
these racial policies.25 By contrast, when ŵ is introduced into the models, symbolic racism in three of the
four cases ceases to be a significant negative predictor,
and in the case of educational quotas becomes significant in the opposite direction.26 Clearly, based
on application of Hausman’s (1978) test and criteria,
assertions about the relationship between symbolic
racism and policy attitudes are fraught with potentially substantial error unless political sophistication is
taken into account.

Discussion
Our analysis seeks to shed light on the relationship
between political sophistication and American racial
attitudes. Rooting our explanation in a theory of heterogeneous attribution, we argue that less sophisticated individuals are more likely than their more
sophisticated counterparts to make localized, individual-level causal attributions for sociopolitical phenomena, and hence to blame African Americans
themselves for their social plight. It has long been
asserted that racism, however defined and operationalized, is particularly strong among the less
sophisticated segment of America’s white population.
Much of the scholarly discussion of racial animosity
in America has centered on “new” or “symbolic” or
“modern” racism, and it has often been demonstrated
that the less educated and/or sophisticated score
higher on these rubrics. Indeed, our own results here
confirm the general accuracy of this view.
Our findings, however, suggest that much of the
relationship between political sophistication and sym25

In three of our four cases, symbolic racism is no longer significant after the inclusion of ŵ . The coefficient sign on these statistically insignificant results does not greatly concern us, since, of
course, their confidence intervals suggest that the true parameter
may rest on either side of zero. The positive and significant coefficient associated with symbolic racism after the inclusion of ŵ in
the “Quotas in Education” model is admittedly puzzling. Yet our
difficulty in explaining the coefficient is directly a function of symbolic racism’s operational nature. Given symbolic racism’s inherent attributional structure and low dimensionality (Tarman and
Sears 2005), it is unclear what remains inherent in the measure
once the bias is removed.

26
Importantly, we do not argue that these policy attitudes are unrelated to racial animus. Indeed, anti-black affect is significant in all
but the food stamp model. What we are questioning is how much
the construct of symbolic racism adds beyond simple anti-black
affect in explaining these attitudes, net of sophistication. Our
answer, based on these examinations, would be fairly little.
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Testing for Systematic Measurement Error in Symbolic Racism’s Effect on Whites’ Opposition to
Policies Designed to Help Blacks, ANES 1986

Independent
Variables

W/O ŵ
With w
Preference in Hiring

W/O ŵ
With ŵ
Quotas in Education

Constant

1.787**
(.323)
.161
(.213)
.117
(.080)
.001
(.003)
.006
(.092)
−.002
(.008)
−.065*
(.029)
.025
(.021)
.092**
(.037)
.010
(.260)
.319
(.231)
−.003
(.002)
−1.163**
(.211)
—

3.386**
(.405)
.788**
(.269)
.062
(.102)
−.003
(.003)
−.174
(.117)
−.017*
(.010)
−.083*
(.037)
.010
(.026)
.094*
(.046)
−.028
(.327)
.135
(.292)
−.002*
(.003)
−2.061**
(.266)
—

Black Interviewer
Female
Age
South
Income
Education
Party ID (Dem)
Ideology (Liberal)
Individualism
Egalitarianism
Anti−Black Affect
Symbolic Racism
ŵ

Adj. R2 =
N=



.109**
637

.515*
(.816)
.127
(.220)
.115
(.081)
.003
(.003)
−.126
(.115)
.004
(.008)
.008
(.052)
.023
(.020)
.129**
(.041)
−.554
(.408)
.780*
(.360)
−.007*
(.003)
.680
(1.103)
−1.894*
(1.122)
.116**
629

.158**
634

.232
(1.028)
.712**
(.277)
.031
(.101)
.001
(.003)
−.467**
(.146)
−.005
(.010)
.105
(.066)
.003
(.026)
.179**
(.053)
−1.343**
(.517)
1.253**
(.454)
−.013**
(.004)
2.482*
(1.390)
−4.699**
(1.416)
.171**
626

W/O ŵ
With ŵ
Food Stamps
.351*
(.218)
−.140
(.143)
.025
(.053)
−.001
(.002)
−.148**
(.062)
−.018**
(.005)
−.013
(.020)
.053**
(.014)
.068**
(.024)
−.572**
(.175)
.225
(.156)
−.001
(.001)
−.573**
(.141)
—
.173**
620

−.185
(.546)
−.174
(.148)
.027
(.053)
.001
(.002)
−.199**
(.079)
−.016**
(.006)
.018
(.036)
.052**
(.013)
.052**
(.014)
−.844**
(.280)
.469*
(.242)
−.001
(.002)
.187
(.743)
−.784
(.757)
.182**
612

W/O ŵ
With ŵ
Federal Aid to Blacks
.006
(.170)
.181*
(.111)
−.001
(.042)
.002
(.001)
−.157**
(.048)
−.005
(.004)
.006
(.015)
.018*
(.011)
.059**
(.020)
.123
(.137)
.519**
(.121)
−.006**
(.001)
−.683**
(.110)
—
.290**
634

−.299
(.423)
.120
(.115)
.003
(.042)
.002
(.001)
−.191**
(.060)
−.003
(.004)
.021
(.027)
.017
(.011)
.064**
(.022)
−.071
(.214)
.692**
(.187)
−.007**
(.001)
−.215
(.571)
−.480
(.583)
.296**
626

Entries are Ordinary Least Squares estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
**p < .01, one-tailed test.
*p < .05, one-tailed test
Source: American National Elections Studies, 1986. The policy positions analyzed are based on variables 860476, 860478, 860330, and
860334, respectively.

bolic racism stems not from racial animus, but from
differential patterns of attribution that reach well
beyond the domain of race. Indeed, our previous
research has shown that the same relationship
between political sophistication and individual-level
attributions that we show here is operative in the
much different domain of economic voting as well
(Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006b). Since much
of the traditional symbolic racism scale is based on
respondent attributions of causality, the general tendency of less sophisticated individuals to seize upon
localized explanations for sociopolitical events can
easily be misconstrued as racial hostility.

Symbolic racism’s fundamental dependence on
cognitive attributions is problematic not only when
the construct is used as a dependent variable, but also
when it is used as a predictor of other racially charged
attitudes. If we do not take into account political
sophistication (as previous scholars have not), it
appears that symbolic racism significantly shapes
individuals’ attitudes toward welfare and affirmative
action, even after controlling for overt anti-black
affect. This suggests the existence of a subtle, covert
racial animus driving white Americans’ responses to
racialized public policies. However, once the symbolic
racism construct is purged of systematic measurement
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error arising from different attributional tendencies of
people at varying levels of political sophistication,
it appears to contribute little beyond ideology, value
orientations, and anti-black affect. From this, we may
infer that any apparent effects of symbolic racism in
the unadjusted policy models are driven by political
sophistication and its link to attributional tendencies,
a general cognitive relationship that transcends the
specific domain of race.
We do not suggest that political sophistication is
unrelated to racial hostility, nor that racial hostility is
unrelated to policy attitudes. More sophisticated individuals consistently evince lower levels of anti-black
affect (as measured by the feeling thermometer) than
do the less sophisticated, and this anti-black affect
is frequently an important predictor of opposition to
racially ameliorative policies. Certainly, the understanding of diverse people and perspectives that typically comes with broad knowledge may be expected to
decrease individuals’ racial prejudices, and decreased
prejudice will obviously make people more open to
the ideas of affirmative action, increased welfare
spending, etc. Our analysis here, however, suggests
that these relationships proceed largely through the
fairly direct, observable medium of anti-black affect,
a measure seemingly untainted by cognitive attributional biases.
In sum, our work demonstrates that scores on the
symbolic racism scale are in large part a function of
an individual’s propensity to make individualistic or
structuralistic attributions. This, in turn, leads us to
exaggerate the racial hostility of less sophisticated
Americans (and, perhaps, to exaggerate the racial tolerance of the more sophisticated). Once this attributional tendency, rooted in political sophistication, is
controlled for, the effects of symbolic racism on policy
attitudes greatly dissipate. Clearly, we must appreciate
the properties of causal attributions if we are truly to
understand the relationship between political sophistication and the “new racism”.
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